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Abstract 
This article analyzes the institutional design of international double tax 
avoidance. The basic argument is that double tax avoidance exhibits the 
strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The 
distribution of tax revenues depends on the asymmetry of investment flows 
between treaty partners. Since investment flows are defined dyadically, 
bilateral bargaining can best accommodate countries’ concern for the 
distribution of tax revenues and other economic benefits connected to the 
tax base. Moreover, because there are no serious externality problems with 
bilateral agreement, this solution is also viable. At the same time, there is 
a need for a multilateral organization to disseminate information and 
shared practices in the form of a model convention that provides a focal 
point for bilateral negotiations. The strategic structure of a coordination 
game can also explain why the institutions of double tax avoidance do not 
have to be equipped with third-party enforcement capabilities. Instead, the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is interpreted as a device to deal with 
the fact that double tax agreements (DTAs) are incomplete contracts. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Design der internationalen Institutionen 
zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung 
Dieser Artikel analysiert die institutionelle Form der internationalen 
Kooperation zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung. Es wird argumen-
tiert, dass das Doppelbesteuerungsproblem als ein Koordinationsspiel mit 
Verteilungskonflikt verstanden werden kann. Die Verteilung der Steuer-
einnahmen hängt von der Asymmetrie der Investitionsflüsse zwischen den 
vertragsschließenden Staaten ab. Da diese Investitionspositionen notwen-
digerweise paarweise variieren, können die Verteilungsinteressen der 
Staaten am besten in bilateralen Verhandlungen aufeinander abgestimmt 
werden. Weil es außerdem bei bilateralen Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen 
keine Externalitäten gibt, sind solche Verträge auch durchsetzbar. Trotz-
dem gibt es Bedarf für eine multilaterale Organisation, die Informationen 
und gemeinsame Praktiken in Form eines Modellabkommens verbreitet. 
Das Modellabkommen dient als Fokalpunkt für die bilateralen Verhand-
lungen. Die strategische Struktur als Koordinationsspiel kann außerdem 
erklären, warum die Institutionen der Doppelbesteuerungsvermeidung 
nicht mit Durchsetzungskapazitäten ausgestattet sind. Das sogenannte 
Verständigungsverfahren zur Beilegung von Vertragsstreitigkeiten dient 
vielmehr als Instrument zur Bearbeitung des Problems unvollständiger 
Verträge. 
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Introduction 
Economic activities cross national borders, whereas the power to tax is 
bound to the nation state. One of the problems resulting from this incon-
gruity is double taxation, which stems from an overlap of jurisdiction to tax 
between a residence state — the country where a taxpayer lives — and a 
source state — the country where the taxpayer’s income was generated. If 
both countries exert to the full their power to tax, then the tax burden for 
international investments is much higher than for national investments. 
In order to prevent this, governments engage in efforts to avoid double 
taxation. The institutional form of international double tax avoidance, 
however, exhibits several remarkable features that are in need of explana-
tion. 
The most remarkable feature of international cooperation to avoid 
double taxation is the fact that double tax agreements (DTAs) are pre-
dominantly bilateral (Whalley 2001, 17-18, Vann 1991).1 This bilateralism 
contrasts with many other international regimes in the economic sphere. 
Most prominent among these is the GATT/WTO — a multilateral regime 
with a commitment to achieving progressive, coordinated trade liberaliza-
tion in simultaneous negotiations. Unlike the GATT/WTO, for example, 
cooperation in double tax avoidance is organized bilaterally, and negotia-
tions take place sequentially. In a classic model Mundell (1957) shows that 
the free flow of goods and common prices lead to factor prices being equal-
ized across countries. Likewise, free factor flow and common factor prices 
lead to equal goods prices. Hence, what can be achieved with goods flow 
can also be achieved with factor flow. As Whalley (2001, 17-18) has pointed 
out Mundell’s factor-goods equivalence could be taken to suggest that the 
institutional form of the tax and trade regimes, which deal with factor and 
goods flows respectively, should be similar or the same. So the puzzle is 
thus: Why is the regime of international double tax avoidance not multi-
lateral? 
Posing the question in this way is somewhat imprecise, because there 
actually are some multilateral elements of tax cooperation. The OECD, as 
                                                     
1 There is one minilateral treaty among the Scandinavian countries that was 
signed in 1983 (cf. Mattsson 2000). This treaty is often referred to in the literature 
because it has remained the only treaty of its kind. Historically, there have also been 
other multilateral treaties (cf. Loukota 1997, 86-87). However, none of them has left a 
mark on the development of international taxation. 
Thomas Rixen y The Institutional Design of International Double Taxation Avoidance 2 
 
 
a multilateral organization, deals with double tax avoidance and other 
issues of international taxation. It publishes a so-called model convention 
(MC) that is negotiated and agreed upon by its member countries. The 
OECD MC is non-binding. In practice, however, nearly all of the bilateral 
tax treaties are based upon this instrument (cf., e.g., Vann 1991, 99). Thus, 
more precisely, the question is why there is no binding multilateral 
agreement. Why is the MC non-binding? What is its function in interna-
tional tax cooperation? How can one account for the coexistence of binding 
bilateral treaties and this multilateral document that serves as a template 
for them? 
When turning to theories of international cooperation for potential 
answers, one finds that the institutional choice between bilateralism and 
multilateralism has hardly been addressed. For one, cooperation theory 
has an inherent analytical bias towards multilateralism and generally 
disregards the antipode to this institutional form, namely, bilateralism 
(Odell 2000, 13).2 Even work that explicitly focuses on the institutional 
form of cooperation in international relations theory fails to contrast 
multilateralism with bilateralism (cf. Ruggie 1993). The disregard of 
bilateralism in international relations (IR) theory cannot be explained with 
the empirical irrelevance of this category — the United Nations treaty 
databank collected 5130 bilateral treaties adopted from 1990 to 1999 
(United Nations 2003).3 Second and more important for the research 
question at hand, research was also largely blind towards the specific 
advantages of an institutional form (Caporaso 1993, 62). When do states 
cooperate bilaterally? What are the relative benefits and costs of bilateral 
compared to multilateral cooperation? Cooperation theory not only disre-
gards bilateralism, it also does not systematically investigate the choice 
between bilateralism and multilateralism. 
This leads to an incomplete understanding of cooperation, including 
multilateral cooperation. As I demonstrate, states consciously choose 
between the two institutional forms and often design institutions with a 
                                                     
2 A particularly ironic critique in this respect can be directed towards early 
game-theoretic regime research that used two-person games to analyze multilateral 
cooperation. Even though the bilateral form of the games would suggest otherwise, one 
hardly finds an explicit discussion of bilateralism in this work. Exceptions in the earlier 
literature are Oye (1985) and Snidal (1985). 
3 This figure is only the lower bound of all bilateral agreements signed in this 
period, because states are not obliged to deposit their treaties with the UN. 
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mix of both bilateral and multilateral elements. A straightforward classifi-
cation of a regime as bilateral or multilateral is not always possible. In 
many regimes, cooperation exhibits bilateral and multilateral elements, 
which interact in systematic ways. Therefore, if we are to gain an appro-
priate understanding of cooperation, it is necessary to develop theories of 
the strategic choice of bilateralism and multilateralism and the ways in 
which these forms can interact or co-exist. 
My account of international tax governance demonstrates a theoreti-
cally informed way of thinking about this choice. I construct an explana-
tion of the tax regime’s particular institutional mix of bilateralism and 
multilateralism by employing some well-established theoretical mecha-
nisms that have been shown to have explanatory power for the design of 
international institutions (see e.g., Koremenos, et al. 2001). Thus, in addi-
tion to opening up the field of international tax cooperation to interna-
tional relations research, the present paper makes a theoretical contribu-
tion on the choice between bilateralism and multilateralism. 
Beyond the issue of bilateralism versus multilateralism another de-
sign feature is noteworthy. There is generally no third party enforcement 
in double tax avoidance. A typical tax treaty only provides for a mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) between the two treaty partners. Why is this 
so? 
My answer to these questions can be summarized in the following ar-
gument: double tax avoidance is a coordination game with a distributive 
conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the symmetry or 
asymmetry of investment flows between treaty partners. As I show in a 
regression analysis, the terms of bilateral tax treaties vary systematically 
with treaty partners’ investment positions. This can be interpreted as 
evidence that bilateral agreements can best accommodate countries’ con-
cerns for the distribution of tax revenues and other economic benefits 
connected to the tax base. However, at the same time, there is a need for a 
multilateral organization to disseminate information and shared practices 
in the form of an MC that provides a focal point for bilateral bargains. 
Since the strategic structure is that of a coordination game, the institu-
tions of double tax avoidance do not have to be equipped with enforcement 
capabilities. Instead, the MAP is a device for dealing with the problems of 
incomplete contracting. 
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To develop this argument, I first present the basic stylized facts of the 
institutional design of double tax avoidance by differentiating between the 
bargaining, agreement, and enforcement phases of international coopera-
tion (part I). From this account I derive a game-theoretic model that can 
explain the various design features, and subject it to an empirical test 
(part II). In part III, I briefly discuss a potentially competing explanation 
for the institutional design. Part IV summarizes the approach and findings 
in this paper, and draws some conclusions for future research strategies 
and theory development. 
I. Distilling the Stylized Facts of the Institutions  
of International Taxation 
In this part, I first give a brief overview of the history and basic workings 
of double tax avoidance. I then derive the stylized facts of institutional 
design on the basis of a differentiation between bargaining, agreement and 
enforcement. 
The History of Double Tax Avoidance 
The history of the double tax regime goes back to the beginning of the last 
century, when a few continental European states signed bilateral double 
tax treaties, mostly with their neighbors. The issue became more promi-
nent in the 1920s when the League of Nations appointed economists to 
address the problem of double taxation, and convened several conferences 
of technical experts and government officials (League of Nations 1923, 
1927). The objective during the “League years” was to draft a multilateral 
treaty. While governments persistently rejected this, they were nonethe-
less very supportive of developing a model convention that could be em-
ployed as a template for bilateral negotiations. They insisted on keeping 
the model convention non-binding, because that would allow the necessary 
flexibility to make nationally differing tax systems compatible to one 
another (Picciotto 1992, 38). The work of the League resulted in the model 
conventions of 1928, 1935, 1943 and 1946. 
In the 1950s and 1960s the OECD has taken over the position of the 
League of Nations (and briefly the United Nations) as the main multilat-
eral policy forum for discussions of international tax issues. Countries’ 
positions remained unchanged. They expressed their opposition to a multi-
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lateral treaty, but were supportive of further developing and adapting the 
MC. The OECD published its first MC and commentary in 1963, followed 
by a revised version in 1977. In 1991, the OECD decided to publish the 
model convention in loose-leaf format, in order to be able to better adapt it 
to changes in the economic environment. Since then the MC has been 
updated continuously, with consolidated versions being published in 1992, 
1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2003. 
The growth rate of bilateral treaties increased strongly after the 
OECD MC was concluded. In 1958, 263 treaties were in force, gradually 
increasing to 333 by 1963 and 600 as of 1978. After the conclusion of the 
1977 MC — and with the further liberalization of capital markets and 
increasing tax ratios in industrialized countries, which made the problem 
of double taxation more prevalent — the number of treaties increased 
rapidly to 1582 in 1998 (Rixen forthcoming, chapter 5). Even though coun-
tries are not obliged to use the MC in their bilateral negotiations, almost 
all of the more than 2000 tax treaties that are in force today follow it. 
Bilateral treaty making basically consists of the treaty partners agreeing 
on the MC and adapting some provisions to their needs.4 
Despite these successes in confronting the issue of double tax avoid-
ance, the development was not without conflict. The most important con-
flict among governments is that between the residence and source princi-
ple of taxation (see below). In general, developed countries are in favor of 
the residence principle, whereas developing countries prefer the source 
principle because it allocates a larger share of the transnational tax base to 
them. The conflict has accompanied the entire history of international tax 
cooperation. One embodiment of this conflict is the existence of different 
model conventions that accord different weights to both principles. Since 
the OECD MC accords greater weight to residence taxation, the UN devel-
oped a competitor model that leans toward source taxation.5 However, 
apart from these divergences in the distribution of taxing rights, the UN 
MC, published in 1980 and in a modernized version in 2000, is not a dis-
tinct alternative but rather a modest modification of the OECD MC 
                                                     
4 The numbers presented here are taken from a self-compiled database. For a 
description of the data and their sources see Rixen (forthcoming, appendix). 
5 The existence of competing model conventions accompanied the history of dou-
ble taxation from very early on. For example, of the two models from 1946, the so-called 
Mexico convention emphasized the source principle, whereas the London version suggests 
residence taxation (League of Nations 1946). 
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(Arnold and McIntyre 1995, 95). It reproduces many of the articles con-
tained therein and, overall, the UN MC relies on the very same mechanics 
and principles as the OECD MC. It pinpoints those provisions of the OECD 
MC that developing countries should strive to modify in bilateral negotia-
tions with developed countries. Altogether, the influence of the UN MC is 
limited but visible. Many developed countries subsequently granted more 
taxation at source in their bilateral treaties with developing or transition 
economies (Kosters 2004, 4). 
Over time, the arrangement of a non-binding multilateral model con-
vention as template for bilateral treaty negotiations has become firmly 
institutionalized. The Commission on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) of the OECD — 
a body of government officials and tax experts, the same persons negotiat-
ing bilateral treaties for their countries — meets on a regular basis 
(Messere 1993). The CFA is the global forum for countries to cooperate in 
matters of taxation (Radaelli 1998), and non-OECD member countries also 
participate in these negotiations. In an ongoing process the CFA strives to 
modernize and adapt the MC. Often technical innovations that come up in 
bilateral treaties are integrated into the model; other innovations are 
developed within the CFA. In the process a common understanding of 
bilateral tax treaty making and interpretation is developed. These common 
understandings and remaining dissent are published in the commentary 
that accompanies the MC, which enjoys considerable authority with courts, 
lawyers and other tax practitioners (cf. Arnold/McIntyre 1995, 98-100). 
Unlike the OECD, the UN has not devoted many resources to international 
taxation and thus did not become a potent rival of the OECD as the main 
policy forum in international taxation (cf. Brauner 2003, 318). 
The ‘Mechanics’ of Double Tax Avoidance: 
Residence vs. Source 
Double taxation results from an overlap of jurisdiction to tax between a 
residence state, where the recipient of income lives, and a source state, 
where the income was generated. If both exert their power to tax to the full 
extent, the total burden on transborder economic activities is prohibitively 
high. In order to obtain the benefits of liberalization, governments have a 
common interest in avoiding such double taxation. In principle, there 
would be two solutions to this problem. Countries could delegate the power 
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to tax international income to an international authority (conjoint taxa-
tion) or they could agree on some rule to share the jurisdiction to tax be-
tween them. Leaving aside the European Union, the first option has never 
seriously been contemplated and is generally believed to be utopian (Tanzi 
1999). Consequently, the problem of double taxation has been dealt with 
along the lines of the second option. Framed in this way the basic question 
that has to be answered is: which country has the right to tax the income, 
and which country must restrict its tax claims (see, e.g., Li 2003, 32-33)? 
No general consensus on a best principle could be achieved. Instead, 
the solution embodied in the various MCs — which remained unchanged in 
its fundamentals from the 1920’s until today — represents the outcome of 
bargains in which conflicting tax claims have been traded off against each 
other on a case-by-case basis (Graetz 2001).6 Jurisdiction to tax is assigned 
to either the source country or the residence country for different kinds of 
income. These rules, codified in Articles 6 to 22 of the OECD model, “per-
form the function of dividing items of income between countries. [They are] 
a set of arbitrary rules that were carefully crafted to support a specific 
compromise” (Brauner 2003, 278-79). Profits can only be taxed in the 
source state, if they are attributed to a permanent establishment (PE), 
which is defined in Article 5 of the OECD MC. Dividends, interests and 
royalties can only be taxed to a limited degree at source (Articles 10-12 of 
the OECD MC). 
According to tax treaty rules, the residence country is obliged to pro-
vide relief from double taxation in cases of full or limited source taxation. 
This can either be done by allowing a credit for the tax paid at source on 
the tax due in the home country or by exempting the income taxed at 
source from home tax altogether (Article 23 of the OECD MC). Impor-
tantly, however, basically all countries already provide for relief of double 
taxation unilaterally. Their national tax codes contain provisions for either 
exempting foreign income from taxation, or granting a credit for taxes paid 
on such income in the source country. In those cases, double taxation is 
                                                     
6 The conflict between residence and source states on the avoidance of double 
taxation is not only interest driven. There is also persistent disagreement in the academic 
literature on whether the residence or source principle is preferable when measured 
against the normative ideals of equality and efficiency (for an overview, see Rixen forth-
coming, chapter 4). 
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already effectively prevented. In a few cases, the national rules only fore-
see partial tax relief (deduction).7 
In order to implement this compromise solution between residence 
and source taxation, the model conventions refer to a series of legal con-
structs that establish the required nexus between the transnational tax 
base and a country. The constructs represent plausible assumptions (and 
make them legally tractable) about the correspondence between transac-
tions across borders and the territorial base of the underlying economic 
activity that is the target of national taxation (Bird and Wilkie 2000, 91-3). 
The important point about these constructs is that they are chosen in such 
a way as to interfere as little as possible with national tax laws. Bilateral 
treaties do not contain comprehensive rules for taxation, but in essence 
achieve nothing more (and nothing less) than disentangling the transna-
tional tax base and assigning it to different jurisdictions so that these can 
apply their own domestic rules to their share of the tax base. Once jurisdic-
tion to tax is established, the country is then basically free to use its own 
national tax law on the respective income. The bilateral treaties merely 
help to “coordinate divergent national tax laws” (Li 2003, 33), they regulate 
the interface of autonomous national tax systems. The legal constructs, on 
which the tax treaty regime is based, refuse to treat the transnational tax 
base as a global phenomenon, but rather force it into a framework of 
territorial delimitation. The advantage of this approach is that govern-
ments retain almost unlimited legal independence over the taxation of 
“their” share of the transnational tax base. The tax treaty regime is built 
on sovereignty-preserving cooperation.8 
Apart from their main function of avoiding double taxation by disen-
tangling the transnational tax base, DTAs also contain provisions on the 
                                                     
7 Under the deduction method, taxes paid abroad are subtracted from the tax 
base on which home taxation is based. Thus, double taxation is not fully relieved. All 
OECD countries provide unilateral tax relief and in most cases they use the credit or 
exemption method, i.e., the same methods that are agreed upon in bilateral treaties, and 
not the deduction method (cf. Yoo 2003). 
8 Emblematic for this approach to territorial disentanglement of tax claims are 
the rules for allocating expenses and profits among different parts of multinational 
enterprises (MNE). For tax purposes, their operations with one another are treated as if 
they were independent market participants — exchanging goods and services at arm’s 
length prices. This has the benefit of de-politicizing the allocation of jurisdiction to tax by 
referring to the seemingly natural solution of market prices (cf. Picciotto 1992, 172). 
Otherwise governments would have to agree on a common definition of the tax base 
(unitary taxation). 
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implementation of these rules. Article 25 lays out the mutual agreement 
procedure (MAP). It serves to resolve any conflicts that arise between 
treaty partners in the application of the DTA. Often, the procedure is 
initiated when a taxpayer claims to have been double-taxed or otherwise 
disadvantaged by either state. In this case, they can ask the authorities 
responsible in their home country to enter into a mutual agreement proce-
dure (MAP) with the other contracting party. Governments are not re-
quired to necessarily come to an agreement in this procedure; in case they 
do not, double taxation persists. However, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases an agreement is reached (Sasseville 2002, 1999). Since the MAP is a 
“political rather than a judicial procedure” (Züger 2001, 15), there have 
been many proposals to replace it with a binding arbitration procedure. 
However, governments have generally refused to agree on an arbitration 
procedure (Sasseville 2002, 271-72). Recently, however, the OECD added 
an additional paragraph to Article 25 of the MC, which foresees the sub-
mission to arbitration if the affected taxpayer so requests, and if the com-
petent authorities do not reach agreement within two years (OECD 2007). 
A couple of bilateral treaties with such complementary arbitration have 
already been concluded (Aoyama 2004, 655). 
Finally, Article 26 of the OECD MC foresees information exchange. 
This enables administrative ease in collecting taxes. 
In summary, international double tax avoidance takes place on three 
interrelated levels: the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels. For 
one, all countries relieve double taxation in their national tax laws, that is, 
on the unilateral level. In effect, they give up entirely or partially their 
right to tax foreign source income, in order to avoid interfering with other 
tax systems. Second, in bilateral negotiations, countries conclude double 
tax treaties which mainly deal with the cooperative avoidance of double 
taxation and the division of taxing rights. Third, international tax policy 
takes place on the multilateral level. Technical experts, national tax ad-
ministrators, and scientific advisors cooperate in international organiza-
tions to develop model conventions, disseminate information on treaty 
practices, standardize the bilateral treaties, and monitor the treaty net-
work. The resultant MCs are legally non-binding, but are quite influential 
in practice. Basically all existent double tax treaties are based on the MC. 
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Sorting the Empirical Evidence: Bargaining,  
Agreement, and Enforcement 
How can we make sense of this institutional pattern? I suggest beginning 
with subsuming the empirical evidence under the established distinction 
between bargaining and enforcement (see, e.g., Fearon 1998; Koremenos, 
et al. 2001). Sometimes, bargaining is referred to as an ex ante problem of 
cooperation, whereas enforcement concerns ex post problems (Williamson 
1985). I have added “agreement” to this differentiation, which is the divid-
ing line between bargaining and enforcement. 
Bargaining refers to negotiating the terms of an agreement. Agree-
ment is the stage of binding decision. It captures the formal conclusion of 
the bargaining period. Enforcement refers to the ex post stage of the coop-
eration process in which countries have to ensure that all treaty partners 
comply with the agreement. Figure 1 depicts the three stages of coopera-
tion on a time line. 
agreement (t1)
enforcementbargaining
t0 t2  
Figure 1: Three Stages of the Cooperation Process 
In each of the stages, countries can choose between bilateralism and multi-
lateralism. Thus, cooperation is not dichotomous per se. Taking into ac-
count the whole process of cooperation, cooperation can be characterized by 
a mix of bilateral and multilateral elements. 
In terms of the three stages of cooperation, the following picture of 
double tax avoidance emerges: Bargaining is bilateral and multilateral. On 
the multilateral level, governments bargain about the non-binding MC. On 
the bilateral level, they bargain about binding double tax treaties and 
agree on the actual concessions they grant each other. Nevertheless, multi-
lateral bargaining has an influence on bilateral bargaining, because the 
MC is the starting point of bilateral bargains. Also, the commentary to the 
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MC is sometimes changed in response to problems that were encountered 
in bilateral negotiations. Multilateral bargaining is complementary to 
bilateral bargaining. Agreement is bilateral in double tax avoidance. Only 
the bilateral treaties contain provisions which are binding on the coun-
tries. The final stage of the cooperation process is enforcement. With re-
spect to this, we can first note that there is no external enforcement 
mechanism in double tax avoidance. Rather, disputes about the application 
of agreements are resolved through the bilateral MAP, which is more a 
diplomatic than a judicial mechanism. Table 1 summarizes these features. 
Table 1: Empirical Observations on the Three Stages of Cooperation 
Stage of Cooperation Empirical Observation 
Bargaining 
1) Bilateral on (binding) tax treaties 
2) Multilateral on (non-binding) MC 
(Binding) Agreement Bilateral on DTAs 
Enforcement No external enforcement, only bilateral MAP 
  
II. Explaining the Institutional Choice 
In this part, I set up a model of double tax cooperation and test it. From 
the empirical material just presented, I reconstruct the strategic structure 
of the problem of double tax avoidance in terms of a game theoretic model. 
I show that the model can explain the institutional form of bargaining, the 
weak institutions of enforcement, and why binding agreement was chosen 
to be bilateral. 
The Strategic Structure: Double Tax Avoidance 
as a Coordination Game 
From the fact that they have engaged in conscious efforts to this effect, we 
can conclude that governments have a common interest in avoiding double 
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taxation.9 Further, they also have an individual incentive to avoid double 
taxation. This is evidenced by the fact that all countries are willing to 
grant double tax relief unilaterally as part of their domestic laws. This 
means that they are willing to grant double tax relief irrespective of 
whether other governments reciprocate in the same way. The problem of 
avoiding over-taxation can thus be framed as a coordination game. 
This derivation of the strategic structure from governments’ observed 
preferences is in line with two common theoretical assumptions in political 
economy about their preferences. First, if one assumes that a government’s 
goal is to maximize national welfare, then the strategic interaction is 
represented by a coordination game (Rixen forthcoming, chapter 3; Dagan 
2000). Second, if we assume that the government pursued its own egoistic 
goal of reelection or political profit (potentially at the expense of national 
welfare), the same conclusion could be drawn. While unilateral tax relief 
can lead to decreasing tax revenues, which may have negative conse-
quences for public spending, this negative effect impacts the whole popula-
tion of a country. Following Olson (1965), such a big group faces a substan-
tial problem of collective action and cannot exert effective political influ-
ence. In contrast, the business lobby is a small group that can manage to 
make their interests heard. There is no other well-organized domestic 
interest group that would oppose granting full unilateral tax relief, in the 
form of credit or exemption, to foreign investment. Thus, even apart from 
the fact that providing full double tax relief may be adequate for the 
maximization of national income, there is an additional domestic political 
argument that makes such a strategy attractive for a government (cf. also 
Bird and Mintz 2003, 439). 
Why Conclude Tax Treaties at All? 
One very important implication of the model of a coordination game is that 
there is no enforcement problem involved in double tax avoidance. Then, 
however, the question arises, why governments should bother to negotiate 
and conclude DTAs at all. What are they bargaining about? 
                                                     
9 For reasons of limited space the derivation of the strategic structure presented 
here is very brief. For an extensive derivation by both theoretical and empirical reasoning, 
see Rixen (forthcoming, chapters 3 and 7). 
Thomas Rixen y The Institutional Design of International Double Taxation Avoidance 13 
 
 
The answer is that the residence country still has an incentive to con-
clude a treaty in order to limit the source country’s right to tax. There are 
two related reasons for this. First, a limit on source taxes reduces the tax 
burden of “its” investors abroad. Second, if the source tax were lowered, 
countries using the credit (or deduction) method to avoid double taxation 
could collect the residual taxes on the foreign income. In other words, while 
the residence country is willing to grant unilateral tax relief no matter how 
much tax the source country collects, it would be even better off if, at the 
same time, source taxation were limited. In such a situation, the level of 
foreign investment flows would be the same, because the overall tax level 
on the investment remained constant; but the residence country could have 
a larger share of the tax revenue and its resident investors would face a 
better tax treatment abroad. In other words, under the unilateral relief 
interaction, only the residence country achieves its second-best outcome. It 
could improve this outcome if taxation at the source were limited. This can 
be achieved through tax treaties (Dagan 2000, 982-83; Davies 2004, 779). 
This still raises the question of why the source country should be will-
ing to enter into a treaty that limits its right to tax, given that the resi-
dence country has already given up its right to tax unilaterally and thus 
double taxation is already avoided? The answer is that countries are gen-
erally residence and source countries at the same time. Residents of one 
state invest in the other state and vice versa. Consequently, investment as 
well as the resulting income flow in both directions. Thus, the interest in 
limiting other countries’ taxation at source should hold irrespective of 
relieving double taxation unilaterally as a residence country. The decisive 
point about this consideration is that governments, while they are able and 
willing to unilaterally forego residence taxation, can only achieve a limit on 
source taxation in other countries if they cooperate with them. Country A, 
in its capacity as a residence country, can only achieve a limit on country 
B’s source taxation through a binding cooperative agreement with the 
latter. In other words, both countries hold a bargaining chip, in that they 
can make concessions on the extent of source taxation. Tax treaties are a 
cooperative mechanism for the reciprocal lowering of source taxation. 
In addition, there are further benefits consisting of two aspects inher-
ent in treaty formation. For one, tax treaties lower the administrative costs 
of taxation, for example, through information exchange. Another advan-
tage is the increased legal certainty that is required by international 
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investors. Rather than having to rely on potentially conflicting national 
rules, the taxation of international income falls under the rules of an 
international agreement. The conclusion of tax treaties has a signaling 
function to international investors that goes beyond that of favorable 
unilateral policies (Dagan 2002, 67). Again, by their very nature, these 
benefits can only be obtained through cooperation with other governments. 
So far, it has been established that countries are willing to provide 
tax relief unilaterally, but that they may have an additional, mutual 
interest in concluding tax treaties. This line of reasoning does not, how-
ever, make a case for a particular institutional form of double tax avoid-
ance, but merely makes the case for any cooperative agreement. In order to 
explain the particular institutional form, the strategic structure has to be 
analyzed in more detail. 
Bilateral Bargaining Accommodates  
Distributive Concerns: The Model 
There is a distributive conflict built into double tax avoidance, which stems 
from the fact that investment flows between countries are often not sym-
metric. While countries are generally residence and source countries at the 
same time, they are so to different degrees. A country that is a net capital 
importer favors more extended source taxation; it has “source interests.” A 
net capital exporter is in favor of residence taxation; it has “residence 
interests” (Kingson 1981, 1158; Rigby 1991, 409-10). Governments often 
disagree about the extent of limitations on source taxation depending on 
whether they have residence or source interests. In a nutshell, the dis-
tributive conflict is about who gets how much of the tax revenue and what 
is the tax burden for a country’s resident investors abroad? 
Overall, the structure of the double tax avoidance game is that of a 
coordination game with a distributive conflict (“battle of the sexes”): adopt-
ing unilateral relief is always preferred to not relieving double taxation, 
but the distributive consequences of that strategy are more or less favor-
able to the country depending on whether they are net capital exporters or 
importers. Now, being a net exporter or net importer is a relational attrib-
ute that can vary with respect to different countries. Country A could have 
source interests in relation to country B, if A is a net capital importer from 
B. At the same time, A might have residence interests in relation to coun-
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try C, exporting capital to C. In relation to country D, there might not be 
any distributive conflict, if capital flows between A and D are symmetric. 
Hence, the nature and intensity of the distributive conflict depend on 
dyadic characteristics. Therefore, as I argue in the following, bilateral 
bargaining can accommodate countries’ conflicting distributive interests. I 
first describe the mechanics of this bargaining game and then provide 
empirical evidence for my claim. 
Figure 2 depicts the bargaining situation for the case of symmetric 
and asymmetric capital flows between potential treaty partners. The 
payoffs of country R are shown on the x-axis, those of country S on the y-
axis. The diagrams show three different welfare levels represented by the 
diagonal lines. By moving from no tax relief to a situation of unilateral tax 
relief and then to coordinated relief under a treaty, both countries gain and 
can thus reach a higher welfare line. In the case of symmetric capital 
flows, the unilateral relief interaction results in an equal distribution of 
the benefits. In the case of asymmetric capital flows the net capital im-
porter, country S in figure 2, gets a bigger share of the benefits (compare 
point A on the left hand side to point A on the right). The difference in 
benefits stems from the difference in national income that the countries 
receive from the foreign investment. The source country can exert some 
taxation at source without reducing the inflow of capital from the other 
country. Since double tax relief is in place, source taxation, at least in the 
form of withholding taxes, does not drive away foreign investment. Since 
investment flows are exogenous to source withholding taxes, the source 
country can gain some tax revenue at the expense of the residence coun-
try.10 The residence country has an incentive to lower the withholding 
taxes at source, because the withholding taxes directly diminish its na-
tional income either in the form of private income (in exemption countries) 
or tax revenue (in credit countries). 
The starting point of treaty negotiations (point A in both graphs) lies 
in the middle of the welfare line for the unilateral relief interaction of 
symmetric countries, whereas in the case of asymmetric countries, it is 
                                                     
10 The most obvious case in which imposing source taxation does not drive away 
foreign investment is that of the residence country granting a foreign tax credit. Taxation 
at source merely results in a revenue transfer from the treasury of the residence country 
to the source country. However, even under different constellations the imposition of 
source withholding taxes does not drive away foreign investment (Hartman 1985; Sinn 
1993). 
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tilted towards the net capital importer. Accordingly, the bargaining space, 
which is the room for Pareto improving negotiation outcomes and is de-
marcated by the dotted lines, is different in both cases. The extent of 
source taxation in the case of symmetric countries should not be controver-
sial. They both benefit equally from a reduction of source taxes. Thus, the 
expectation is that source taxes are lower in the case of symmetric coun-
tries. In contrast, there should be conflict over this question in the case of 
asymmetric countries with net capital exporters in favor of low and net 
capital importers in favor of high source taxes. Since the bargaining space 
is tilted towards the net importer’s interests, the outcome of this bargain 
should be higher source taxes than in the case of symmetric countries. This 
is indicated in the diagram by the fine dotted lines that facilitate compari-
son of the outcomes of treaty negotiations between symmetric and asym-
metric countries (point B in both graphs). 
If the preferred treaty rate depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of 
capital flows, this could be an argument for bilateral treaties, since capital 
flows are defined bilaterally. The qualitative evidence on the conflict 
between developing and developed countries presented in part 2 would 
support this. One of the reasons governments refused to conclude a multi-
lateral treaty was the distributive conflict over the allocation of the tax 
base between countries with residence and source interests. 
Hypothetical outcome of 
uncoordinated 
interaction if R were net 
capital importer
C =
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Figure 2: Tax Treaty Bargaining between Symmetric  
and Asymmetric Countries 
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Testing the Model 
In order to substantiate this explanation I subject it to a quantitative test. 
The central provisions of the typical tax treaty concerning the extent of 
source taxation are the withholding tax rates on passive investment in-
come. An observable implication of the model is that these treaty rates 
should be higher, the more asymmetric the bilateral investment flows. In 
addition, the outcome of negotiations should also depend on the relative 
bargaining power of countries. A more powerful country should be able to 
press for its preferred treaty rate more successfully. To test these proposi-
tions, I set up a regression model. 
The negotiated withholding tax rate, as the dependent variable, is 
taken from a set of 80 DTAs.11 A treaty contains four kinds of withholding 
taxes: on dividends, dividends between associated enterprises, interest, 
and royalties (Articles 10 to 12 of the OECD MC); thus the number of 
observations on the dependent variable is 320. Since I am using all four 
kinds of treaty withholding rates simultaneously, the standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering. The coefficients can be interpreted as the relation 
between the respective independent variable and the average level of 
withholding taxes rather than a specific tax. 
The dyadic investment position, i.e., the asymmetry of bilateral for-
eign direct investment (FDI) stocks, is the first independent variable of 
interest. It is measured as the difference between the “outward FDI stock,” 
the stock that the first country holds in the second country, and the “in-
ward FDI stock,” which is the stock of the second country held in the 
first.12 Since all country pairs have been arranged in such a way that the 
net capital exporter is in first position, this is always a positive number. 
                                                     
11 For a description of all the quantitative data used in this paper see Rixen 
(forthcoming, appendix). The data and the regression results not reported here are 
available from the author upon request. 
12 There are two kinds of FDI data. There is the FDI flow in a given year, measur-
ing the new investment flowing into and out of a country, and the FDI stock accumulated 
over time in a country. This latter measure should be expected to be relevant for tax 
treaty negotiations, since it is the income generated from the stock of foreign investment 
that is to be subjected to taxation. Given this difference, the preceding discussion of the 
effect of “capital flows” might appear incorrect. However, it can be justified because the 
stock measure represents the long-term capital flows between two countries more accu-
rately than the annual measures of capital flows, which fluctuate significantly. In addi-
tion, using the stock data instead of the flow data can ameliorate potential endogeneity 
problems — if one thought that the flow of FDI depended on the negotiated withholding 
rate rather than the other way around. 
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The expectation is that the more unequal the investment position (that is 
the higher the asymmetry of FDI stocks), the higher the negotiated rate. 
The coefficient should be positive. 
As a proxy for bargaining power, the other independent variable, I 
use the concept and the data of the “correlates of war project”, which 
constructs its “capability index“ as a mix of military expenditure and 
personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, total and urban 
population (COW 2001).13 I measure the bargaining power of the first 
country, i.e., the capital exporter, as the relative share of the sum of the 
bargaining power of both treaty partners. Since the capital exporter should 
favor lower over higher withholding rates, the variable should have a 
negative effect on the treaty rate. Since the outcome of negotiations should 
depend on the investment position and the bargaining power at the time of 
treaty conclusion, the data for all variables are those for the year in which 
the treaty was signed. 
Additionally, I control for the wealth of treaty partners, measured as 
the sum of per capita GDP. It is conceivable that wealthier countries are 
less dependent on trying to tax the foreigner and thus the expectation is 
that the coefficient has a negative sign. Furthermore, in an analysis simi-
lar to mine, it was found that this variable influenced the negotiated tax 
rate (Chisik and Davies 2004, 1136). 
Column 2 of table 2 shows the results of this first regression model. 
Under this specification, the overall explanatory power of the model is low. 
Only 6.4 percent of the variance of the dependent variable can be ex-
plained. A possible reason for the low R2 could be that a particular with-
holding rate can best be explained by reference to the income on which it is 
levied. In order to test for this possibility, I include dummy variables for 
each kind of withholding rate. The dummy variable for, let us say, dividend 
taxes is 1, if the respective dependent variable is the dividend tax rate, and 
0, if it is any of the other tax rates. Thus, the coefficients report the aver-
age tax rate for the respective type of income. The result of the second 
regression model is depicted in column 3 of table 2. The inclusion of the 
control variables increases the overall explanatory power of the model. 43.8 
per cent of the overall variance can be explained. 
                                                     
13 In regressions not reported here, I have also experimented with other possible 
specifications of bargaining power. Using the relative share of GDP or the relative share 
of military expenditure yields similar results as those reported below. 
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The results confirm the idea that negotiated withholding rates vary sys-
tematically with respect to the investment position. The coefficient has the 
expected sign and is significant at the 0.1 per cent level.14 It suggests that 
an increase in the asymmetry of capital flows by one million dollars leads 
to an increase in the withholding tax of 0.0000553 percentage points. 
While this number may appear small, it can be shown to be highly plausi-
ble. The estimation suggests that the average withholding rate in a treaty 
                                                     
14 Note that the dataset is actually biased against my prediction. Due to problems 
of FDI data availability, the set contains mostly OECD countries. The capital flows 
between these countries is generally more symmetric than that between developed and 
developing countries. 
Table 2: Determinants of Negotiated Withholding Taxes —  
Linear Regressions  
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 
12.35 *** 
(7.44) 
18.41 *** 
(11.52) 
Investment position 
(Asymmetry in FDI stock) 
0.0000553 *** 
(3.63) 
0.0000553 *** 
(3.62) 
Bargaining Power 
(Share of Capability Index) 
0.95 
(0.85) 
0.95 
(0.84) 
Sum of per capita GDP 
– 0.000125 *** 
(– 3.59) 
– 0.000125 *** 
(– 3.57) 
Dividend tax dummy  N.A. 
Associated dividend tax dummy  
– 8.325 *** 
(– 17.05) 
Interest tax dummy  
– 7.838 *** 
(– 11.35) 
Royalty tax dummy  
– 8.075 *** 
(– 12.67) 
Number of observations (N) 320 320 
R2 0.064 0.449 
  
t-values in parentheses 
(Robust Standard errors) 
 *** significant at 0.1 per cent level 
 ** significant at 1 per cent level 
 * significant at 5 per cent level 
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between the United States and Japan, where the asymmetry of investment 
stock in the year of signing was $102,458 million, should be 5.5 percent 
higher than that between Australia and New Zealand (asymmetry of 
$2,430 million). In other words, since there are sizeable differences in 
countries’ capital positions, the resultant differences in tax rates are also 
sizeable. 
The expectations concerning the influence of bargaining power do not 
hold. The coefficient has a positive sign and is insignificant. This result 
contradicts anecdotal evidence in the literature that more powerful nations 
try to pressure less powerful countries to agree on the tax rate as the 
former see fit (cf., for example, McIntyre 1993, 318).15 
The dummy variables on the different tax rates are all highly signifi-
cant. The coefficient of the constant, which is 18.41, can be interpreted as 
the effect of the dividend tax dummy on the withholding rate. The effect of 
the associated dividend tax dummy is 10.085 (– 8.325 + 18.41), that of the 
interest tax dummy 10.572 (– 7.838 + 18.41), and that of the royalty tax 
dummy is 10.335 (– 8.075 + 18.41). Together with the increase in R2 this 
suggests that the tax dummies can explain the general level of the respec-
tive rates. This may be interpreted as evidence that there are focal points 
of generally accepted rates for different kinds of income and the variance 
around these rates can be explained by the asymmetry in the stocks of 
FDI. 
Interestingly, the estimated effect of the dividend tax dummy and the 
interest tax dummy are quite close to the suggestions of the OECD MC (15 
and 10 percent respectively). However, the coefficients of the associated 
dividend tax dummy and the royalty tax dummy diverge considerably from 
the suggestions of the MC (5 and 0 percent respectively). This implies that, 
for the latter two kinds of income, the OECD MC is not as well accepted as 
a focal point as it is for interest and dividend income. This interpretation 
can be further substantiated by an analysis of the commentary to the 
OECD MC. Governments have entered far more reservations and observa-
tions on the suggested rates for associated dividends and royalties than for 
dividend and interest payments (OECD 2005, Commentary, Reservations 
and Observations on Articles 10, 11 and 12). 
                                                     
15 This interpretation presumes that the capability index is an adequate proxy for 
bargaining power. As is well recognized in the political science literature it is notoriously 
difficult to measure power (Baldwin 2002). 
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Finally, the negotiated rate is indeed lower if treaty partners are 
wealthy. The coefficient of sum of per capita GDP is negative and highly 
significant. 
These results are in line with the results of Chisik and Davies (2004), 
who did a similar analysis with different data from those used here. Thus, 
my analysis is complimentary and, to the extent that my dataset includes 
newer treaties, provides an update of theirs. 
Overall, these results provide strong quantitative support for the no-
tion that the politics of double tax avoidance are driven by the distributive 
conflict between residence and source states. The systematic variation of 
bilateral tax treaties according to bilaterally defined investment positions 
of countries provides a strong argument for bilateral bargaining. In dyadic 
bargaining, the terms of the tax treaty can be designed to accommodate 
each country’s particular investment situation. Under multilateral bar-
gaining, governments would find it difficult or impossible to agree on one 
precise sharing rule that serves their revenue interests in relation to all of 
the others. In other words, multilateral bargaining would be very expen-
sive in terms of transaction costs. 
However, if countries prefer bilateral bargains, this then raises the 
question of why governments engage in complementary multilateral coop-
eration on the development of the MC. 
The Interaction of Bilateralism and Multilateralism: 
Constructed Focal Points 
In order to answer this question, one has to differentiate between the 
technical side of the problem of double tax avoidance and the problem of 
the distribution of benefits. Both issues have to be resolved through bar-
gaining. On the technical side, the legal constructs to implement the 
avoidance of over-taxation have to be decided upon. This is represented by 
a pure coordination game. It may not matter so much which concepts are 
chosen; the important point is that agreement on any solution is attained. 
Since all governments were in favor of sovereignty-preserving solutions, 
there was no serious bargaining problem involved in coming to an agree-
ment on the legal constructs employed in DTAs. On the other hand, the 
distributive conflict can be expected to be very tough. This is because there 
is no serious enforcement problem in double tax avoidance, while at the 
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same time the distributive conflict is strong. Under this combination, 
governments have an incentive to “hold out” for a long time to come to a 
favorable agreement, because they know it will stick for a long time 
(Fearon 1998, 270-71). Of course, holding out incurs costs for both coun-
tries, so that there is a mutual interest to moderate the intensity of bar-
gaining in order to minimize transaction costs. The instrument chosen to 
achieve this is the multilateral MC. In order to show this, I consider how 
bargaining problems are resolved. 
Bargains very often find their solution in so-called focal points, which 
is the point of convergent expectations of actors with an overriding interest 
to agree on a coordinated outcome. Focal points are defined as social con-
ventions that are not questioned but which are followed “automatically” 
because they have become self-evident. They are more obvious, conspicu-
ous, and prominent points of agreement than other possible solutions. 
Depending on the particular bargaining problem at hand, a focal point can 
have different sources. It may come from history, social norms, and cul-
ture, or simply represent a status quo. If actors are in a bargaining situa-
tion where such a focal point exists, bargaining should consume less time 
and effort because the solution gravitates towards the focal point 
(Schelling 1980, 57-80). 
As shown above, there is no self-evident solution to the problem of 
double tax avoidance. Neither the academic nor the political debate about 
the proper allocation of jurisdiction to tax to the residence or source coun-
try has ever been settled (Rixen forthcoming, chapter 4). In other words, a 
focal point is not available. The creation of institutions “can fill this void. 
By embodying, selecting, and publicizing particular paths on which all 
actors are able to coordinate, institutions may provide a constructed focal 
point” (Garrett and Weingast 1993, 176). In the case at hand, governments 
engage in the intentional creation of a focal point in the form of model tax 
conventions that limit the range of possible solutions.16 
Of course, when negotiations at the League of Nations began, the ini-
tial goal was not to construct a focal point for bilateral bargains, but to 
                                                     
16 Note that the nature of the model convention as a constructed focal point is 
somewhat different than the case discussed by Garrett and Weingast (1993, 187-91). They 
consider the decisions of a third party, the European Court of Justice, to be a constructed 
focal point, whereas, in my case, the governments themselves are involved in the con-
struction of the model conventions. 
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come to a binding multilateral DTA. However, this proved to be elusive, so 
governments contented themselves with coming to an agreement on a 
model convention for bilateral bargains. The attempt to find a focal solu-
tion was subject to bargaining problems similar to those faced in negotia-
tions about binding agreement itself. Importantly, it proved to be compa-
rably easy to come to agreement on the technical side of the problem, i.e., 
to agree on legal constructs that are capable of achieving the coordination 
of different national tax laws. While there were important technical prob-
lems to be resolved that required some ingenuity from tax experts, all 
actors agreed that the technical solution should be sovereignty preserving. 
However, the distributive conflict was more difficult to solve; the difficul-
ties encountered in trying to forge agreement on the MC within interna-
tional organizations and the fact that there are two competing models in 
terms of the distribution of benefits are evidence of this. 
The fact that the OECD MC is non-binding can explain why it was 
nonetheless possible to forge an agreement. Since governments know ex 
ante that they are allowed to deviate from the convention in their bilateral 
agreements, they are more willing to subscribe to a model, even if it may 
not entirely conform to their distributive preferences. The flexibility inher-
ent in soft law is one of the main reasons that it is chosen by governments. 
Rather than having to “accommodate divergent national circumstances 
within a single text,” it leaves “flexibility in implementation” (Abbott and 
Snidal 2000, 445). The multilateral MC pre-structures the bilateral bar-
gains, but it does not predetermine them entirely. It is merely the starting 
point for bilateral negotiations, in which a binding solution to accommo-
date parties’ distributive interests is achieved. 
Importantly, the non-binding nature of the MC does not matter for its 
effectiveness with respect to the technical side of double tax avoidance. 
Since all countries have the desire to be coordinated, any workable solution 
that is found is accepted and there is no reason to deviate from this solu-
tion in bilateral bargains. In this sense, the OECD MC provides standards, 
which countries voluntarily adopt in their bilateral bargains. As is the case 
in most standard-setting regimes, while making the rules binding on 
countries would not meet with resistance, there is no need to do so, be-
cause they wish to follow them in any case. The rules are self-enforcing. At 
the same time, since there are indeed various technical problems involved 
in developing these standards, there is a demand for pooling the expertise 
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and information, and making it available to other governments. A multi-
lateral institution that is specialized in collecting, creating, and dissemi-
nating information can fulfill this task (cf. Snidal 1985, 928). 
The fact that distributive problems and not technical issues are at the 
heart of difficulties in achieving agreement on a focal point is evident in 
the historical development. As shown, agreement on the technical side of 
the problem emerged earlier under the League of Nations. However, the 
League years ended with two technically identical conventions, the Mexico 
and London models, but each with different distributive implications – one 
emphasizing the source, the other the residence principle. Agreement on 
one model convention was elusive because of the heterogeneous group of 
countries in the League of Nations. During the OECD years, governments 
managed to agree on one model. This success was facilitated by the fact 
that the OECD is made up of a relatively small group of countries with 
relatively symmetric capital flows between them. Therefore, the distribu-
tive conflict between these countries is weaker. Accordingly, in combina-
tion with the non-binding character of the model, agreement was easier. 
Importantly though, the technical solutions that were developed in the 
previous period were not challenged ,but merely further developed and 
refined. 
The adoption of a model by a such a small and exclusive group of 
countries also has consequences for the countries remaining outside the 
agreement. Given the sophistication and resources devoted to double tax 
avoidance at the OECD, the MC became the technically best developed 
model. Due to the overall nature of double tax avoidance as a coordination 
game, countries generally accept the OECD MC, since it provides such a 
technical standard. Even though it was not developed by an all-inclusive 
group of countries, the outsiders voluntarily follow the standards adopted 
within the OECD. The OECD MC eventually became entrenched as the 
“natural” solution to the problem of avoiding double taxation. 
This may also have consequences for the question of the distribution 
of benefits. Since OECD countries were the “first at the table,” they could 
implement a system that favored residence countries. The best that the 
“last at the table” — the developing countries — could do was to follow the 
OECD, even though the rules were less favorable to the latecomers than 
their preferred source principle (Horner 2001, 183-84). The first-mover 
advantage, a feature of coordination games, may account for the fact that, 
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in general, the rules are of such a nature that they favor developed coun-
tries. The disadvantaged countries have tried to change this situation and 
attempted to counter-balance the OECD MC through the UN MC. While 
the UN did not explicitly attempt to challenge the technical solutions, its 
MC aims to be a corrective to the distributive solution that emerged within 
the OECD. The OECD MC has quite clearly not achieved universal accep-
tance as a focal point with respect to the issue of the distribution of bene-
fits. The empirical evidence about the influence of the tax dummy vari-
ables on the level of different withholding rates supports this view. The 
suggested rates for royalties and associated dividends are less well ac-
cepted than those for dividends and interest. 
But even the coexistence of two distributively divergent model con-
ventions facilitates bilateral bargaining. The fact that the disagreement 
about the distribution of benefits is embodied in multilateral model con-
ventions sponsored by well-respected international organizations legiti-
mizes the distributive conflict. The discussions of these problems in multi-
lateral forums allow treaty negotiators to anticipate the areas where 
conflict can be expected, and thus enable a quicker resolution of the dis-
tributive issues in the bilateral setting. Multilateral bargaining about focal 
solutions rationalizes the distributive conflict and thereby mitigates it to a 
certain extent. 
The Enforcement Phase and the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
After the discussion of the institutional design as it applies to the bargain-
ing phase of international tax cooperation, I now turn to the enforcement 
phase. As argued above, there are no enforcement problems in DTAs. 
Turning to a closer investigation, I further substantiate this claim in the 
following. 
First of all, one of the most important sources of enforcement prob-
lems is strongly mitigated in double tax avoidance: monitoring is not 
problematic at all in the case of tax treaties. Any violation of a treaty can 
be easily detected because there is a natural third party to the agreement 
to ensure this — namely, the taxpayer. If one of the treaty partners vio-
lates a DTA, the taxpayer will notice this violation and notify the compe-
tent authorities in his/her home country. The countries then enter into 
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MAP negotiations in order to try to reach an agreement over the treaty 
violation. 
The absence of a serious enforcement problem does not, however, 
mean that there are no conflicts in applying the provisions of the treaty. As 
shown, the MAP is employed quite often. However, rather resulting from 
conscious and deliberate efforts to cheat treaty partners, the disputes often 
stem from problems in interpreting the agreement correctly. Given that 
domestic and international tax rules are complicated, avoiding double 
taxation can be understood as a complex transaction. The main feature of 
such complex transactions is that not all future contingencies can be dealt 
with at the time of concluding the contract, because they are not known, 
or, even if they can be anticipated, the transaction costs of agreeing on 
contractual provisions for all contingencies would be too high. For example, 
given the long life expectancy of a treaty, it is often necessary to adapt the 
treaty to changes in domestic tax laws (Vann 1998, 725). Tax treaties are 
thus necessarily incomplete contracts that involve indeterminacy, and often 
have to be amended to accommodate new circumstances ex post. Contract 
theory suggests that, in such circumstances, treaty partners should not try 
to agree on what will be done in each contingency ex ante, but instead 
should keep the treaty more general and agree on a procedure to be fol-
lowed, should a dispute arise over the application of the provisions.17 The 
procedure chosen in tax treaties is the MAP. Its major function is that of a 
flexible mechanism of ex post treaty negotiations. It enables “ad hoc and ex-
post agreement” between governments through which divergent treaty 
interpretations can be brought into line and “temporary or unforeseen 
problems” be addressed (Aoyama 2004, 653). The MAP is an “ongoing 
treaty negotiation” (Lindencrona/Mattsson 1981, 24).18 
                                                     
17 Parties to an agreement will nonetheless try to make their contracts as precise 
as possible ex ante. Thus, the expectation is that treaties will become more and more 
complex over time, as negotiators learn about potential contingencies that have arisen in 
other treaties. Sasseville (1999, 54) demonstrates the growing complexity of treaties, 
using the example of Austrian DTAs concluded since 1950. While the average number of 
words in treaties concluded before 1950 was 2764, and between 1950 and 1960 5034, it 
has grown to 5599 (1960-70), 6444 (1970-80), 6787 (1980-90) and 9189 (since 1990). 
18 This can be substantiated by the kinds of cases that are treated under the 
MAP. According to the OECD commentary, the “most common cases” involve transfer 
pricing disputes, determining the taxable profits of a PE, the tax treatment of associated 
enterprises, the classification of payments as interests or dividends, and lack of informa-
tion of the authorities about taxpayers’ actual situations, especially concerning their 
residence or the existence of a PE (OECD 2005, Commentary on Article 25, para. 8). The 
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Given that the ex post negotiation over the agreement is the major 
function of the MAP, it is understandable that governments did not choose 
an external enforcement mechanism, and generally resisted the introduc-
tion of binding arbitration. They wish to determine the terms of agreement 
by themselves and retain the flexibility to adapt the agreement to new 
circumstances, rather than grant the power of treaty interpretation and ex 
post amendment to a third party (cf. Green 1998, 129-37). In addition to its 
desirability, the absence of a major enforcement problem makes such a 
solution viable. The fact that the MAP enables the ad hoc and ex post 
adaptation of tax treaties to new circumstances may also be a good expla-
nation for the fact that, on average, treaties between OECD countries are 
changed formally only every 14 years (Sasseville 1999, 56). Given the 
flexibility of the MAP, formal treaty renegotiations may not be considered 
necessary. 
If an external mechanism is not needed in the enforcement of tax 
treaties, why then has the OECD recently (OECD 2007) suggested arbitra-
tion in tax treaty matters? The answer lies in the difficulties of bargaining. 
The ex post negotiations under the MAP are subject to the same bargaining 
problems as ex ante negotiations. Given the distributive conflict, there is 
the danger that treaty negotiations could become protracted, because 
negotiators have an incentive to hold out. This is not only undesirable from 
the perspective of taxpayers who remain in a situation of uncertainty 
regarding their tax payments; it is also undesirable for negotiators who 
have a mutual interest in speeding up the MAP. The development de-
scribed above — the adoption of several treaties with arbitration comple-
mentary to the MAP and the OECD promoting such solutions — is evi-
dence for this. Complementary arbitration provides an incentive for nego-
tiators to speed up the procedure. If spelled out as complimentary to the 
MAP, arbitration can be understood as a credible commitment device. A 
provision for arbitration makes this commitment credible. “[T]he entire 
mechanism is designed to help the MAP work more effectively” (Aoyama 
2004, 663). The fact that few cases have actually moved to the stage of 
arbitration is evidence that complimentary arbitration is indeed successful 
in achieving this goal. 
                                                                                                                                                        
common feature of all these cases is that double taxation results from domestic bodies 
interpreting certain facts or treaty provisions in a different manner (Züger 2001, 2). 
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Contrasting Cases: Bilateral Agreement and the  
Absence of Free-Rider Problems 
So far, it has been argued that bilateral bargaining is well suited to ac-
commodate governments’ distributive concerns. In addition, there is no 
major enforcement problem that would require third party enforcement. 
But this does not explain why binding agreement is bilateral in tax treaty 
making. As we have seen, there is an important role for complementary 
multilateral bargaining in order to provide focal points for bilateral bar-
gains. This raises the possibility that countries could also come to a bind-
ing multilateral agreement. In fact, it is easy to draft a multilateral tax 
treaty that contains the same provisions as the OECD MC (Lang, et al. 
1997; Lang 1997). Governments could, in principle, agree on a multilateral 
tax treaty that would leave them distributional flexibility. The distribu-
tively sensitive aspects could still be determined in bilateral bargains and 
subsequently all countries involved could agree on one multilateral docu-
ment that included a series of bilaterally varying provisions.19 Why, then, 
is agreement not multilateral in double tax avoidance? 
The answer is that there is no need for such a binding multilateral 
framework in double tax avoidance because there is no free rider problem. 
This point can be worked out by contrasting the cases of the international 
trade and tax regime (the following argument is developed in more detail 
in Rixen and Rohlfing 2007): In international trade liberalization, which 
has for a long time been achieved through bilateral agreement, countries 
have to balance the interests of “their” import-competers and exporters. 
They generally do not engage in unilateral trade liberalization and can 
best achieve this balance in bilateral agreements. However, once they have 
struck a deal, the balance achieved in relation to one country may be upset 
by a subsequent trade agreement between their treaty partner and a third 
country. If that agreement is more favorable to the third country, the 
exporters of the first country may suffer. In order to prevent this, govern-
ments introduced Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses into their bilateral 
agreements, so that their exporters would always be given the best treat-
ment that their treaty partners grant to any country. Thus, MFN treat-
ment, which became mandatory under the GATT, is intended to ensure 
                                                     
19 In fact, the one instance of multilateralism (or rather minilateralism) — the 
Scandinavian tax treaty — is of this kind (Vann 1991, 151). 
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that the domestic balance between import-competers and exporters is not 
disturbed. However, once a series of bilateral agreements with MFN 
treatment is in place, a positive externality for other countries is produced. 
Governments have an incentive to lean back and wait for other countries to 
conclude agreements, which they are able to access without granting any 
concessions themselves. In this situation, multilateral agreement is an 
institutional safeguard by which such free riding can be prevented. After 
all concessions have been exchanged, each member country can consider 
the bargains in conjunction. If one country believes that another intends to 
free ride on its concessions, the former can withhold some of the conces-
sions previously granted and insist on additional concessions by the poten-
tial free rider. 
In international taxation the situation is different. A third-country ef-
fect of the kind that led to the introduction of MFN treatment in interna-
tional trade does not exist. Initially, it is conceivable that a government 
would like to ensure that no third country gets a better deal from one of its 
treaty partners. One motive might be concerns about competitiveness; a 
country might want to make sure that its own investors get at least the 
same concessions as investors from other countries. Accordingly, it could 
insert an MFN clause into its treaties to ensure that, if its treaty partners 
agree on more favorable terms with other countries, these will also be 
extended to its own investors. The fact that MFN clauses are sometimes 
found in tax treaties indicates that such considerations may play a role in 
tax treaty making. However, MFN treatment is more an exception than 
the rule in tax treaties. In fact, the quantitative evidence presented above 
suggests that the kind of third-country effects that would make MFN 
treatment desirable cannot be very strong. Otherwise, the correlation 
between withholding tax rates and bilateral investment positions would 
not be as strong, because an MFN clause clearly upsets the distributional 
balance that constitutes the main reason for reciprocal concession making 
in bilateral bargains. And indeed, it can be shown that the way MFN 
clauses are used in tax treaties has more to do with the desire to balance 
bilateral, reciprocal deals, than to actually grant benefits to third countries 
(Lennard 2005, 99-100).20 
                                                     
20 The treaty between Norway and Australia may serve as an example. Norway 
was not able to push through its desired low withholding rates. In order to at least “win” 
something in the negotiations, it managed to introduce an MFN clause that foresees the 
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The decisive difference between taxation and trade is that, in the 
trade regime, MFN treatment has become mandatory for solving an en-
forcement problem: if there is no mandatory MFN treatment, the fear is 
that an unraveling of all bilateral bargains would occur due to the third-
country effect. This fear is clearly not present in the case of the tax treaty 
regime. If a government dislikes the fact that a third country has been 
granted more favorable tax treatment by one of its treaty partners, this 
does not induce the government to defect from the treaty. In trade, the 
domestic balance between import-competers and exporters that has been 
disturbed by the third country effect provides an incentive to defect from 
the prior treaty. In international taxation, since a comparable politically 
salient conflict does not exist, a country would not defect from prior agree-
ments, even if one made the questionable assumption of a strong third-
country effect. This explains why there is no mandatory MFN treatment in 
double tax avoidance and why it is rarely used in practice. Consequently, 
the possibility to free ride on the concessions other countries have made is 
not a relevant factor, and thus there is no need for a binding multilateral 
agreement. 
In consequence, whereas bilateral agreements in international trade 
create externalities that countries wish to internalize by means of binding 
multilateral agreement, externalities of this kind do not exist in double tax 
avoidance.21 Governments do not come to a binding multilateral agree-
ment, quite simply because there is no need for it. The fact that the tax 
regime has a strong bilateral element and a switch to a multilateral tax 
treaty did not occur, challenges the claim that “solving coordination prob-
lems is institutionally neither complex nor particularly demanding, and it 
                                                                                                                                                        
renegotiation of the treaty, should Australia grant lower withholding taxes in the future 
(Lennard 2005, 99). In most tax treaties, MFN treatment is not granted automatically, 
but only consists of a commitment to renegotiate (Hofbauer 2005). 
21 This reasoning leaves aside negative externalities resulting from issues of tax 
evasion, avoidance or competition (“double non-taxation”). While it is certainly true that 
these externalities may pressure countries to find multilateral solutions, the abstraction 
from these externalities is justified by the empirical record. The problem of double non-
taxation is addressed by constructing a multilateral support structure, which is institu-
tionally distinct from the bilateral tax treaty network. While it is true that a more princi-
pled solution would integrate the two problems of double tax avoidance and double non-
taxation in an “international tax institution structured like the GATT” (Vann 1991, 100), 
it seems unlikely that the institutional path of bilateral tax treaty making can be left 
easily. The bilateral double tax regime develops in a path-dependent fashion (Rixen 
forthcoming, chapter 8). 
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was the domain in which multilateralism […] flourished in the nineteenth 
century” (Ruggie 1993, 22). My argument turns Ruggie’s logic around. 
Precisely because the underlying strategic structure does not necessarily 
require multilateral agreement, binding agreement could remain bilateral. 
The multilateral institutions of double tax avoidance “only” have a facili-
tating role for resolving bargaining problems — a task that they accom-
plish successfully, as the continuing growth and substantial degree of 
homogenization of the treaty network shows. 
III. A (Potentially) Competing Explanation: 
Bilateralism Preserves Sovereignty 
Only to the extent that the mechanisms just identified fare better than 
other potential explanations can we put some trust in their validity (see, 
e.g., George and Bennett 2005, 117-19). Because I do not have the space for 
an in-depth analysis of competing explanations here, I briefly consider just 
the most common one. It is quite common to “explain” the bilateral nature 
of double tax agreements by a broad and often unspecified reference to the 
desire of countries to maintain their tax sovereignty (cf., e.g., Abbott and 
Snidal 2000, 441). While this claim is hardly ever spelled out in a fully 
developed account of the institutional design of international tax govern-
ance, it could be understood as a competing explanation. 
First of all, it is true that governments want to preserve their tax sov-
ereignty. The institutional setup is constructed in a sovereignty-preserving 
way, so that double taxation can be avoided by interface regulation. Gov-
ernments cherish the flexibility of this setup which allows them to design 
their domestic tax laws independently of other countries. However, this 
fact by itself is not a sufficient condition for the bilateral nature of tax 
treaties. For one, it would be conceivable to conclude a multilateral tax 
treaty based on the very same legal constructs and technical solutions 
currently used in bilateral tax treaties. Such a treaty would be just as 
sovereignty-preserving as a bilateral treaty. This shows that multilateral-
ism does not restrict sovereignty per se. Likewise, the bilateral form as 
such need not necessarily be more sovereignty-preserving than multilater-
alism. Rather, the substantive provisions contained in a treaty determine 
whether it preserves national sovereignty or not. For example, bilateral tax 
treaties that were not based on separate accounting but would instead use 
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unitary taxation with formulary apportionment would require the defini-
tion of a common tax base. This would restrict a single government’s tax 
sovereignty more than a multilateral treaty based on the arm’s length 
standard. 
Second, as shown elsewhere (Rixen forthcoming, chapter 8), govern-
ments are, if only grudgingly, willing to compromise some of their national 
tax sovereignty in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance. This is a 
reaction to the functional requirements of this problem, which are funda-
mentally different from those of double tax avoidance. The difference in the 
reaction to the two problems shows that the sovereignty-preserving and 
bilateral approach in the realm of double tax avoidance hinges on the 
underlying strategic structure. While the desire to preserve national sover-
eignty may be one of the reasons why governments find this particular 
setup attractive, the fact that such a solution was viable cannot be ex-
plained by reference to this desire. Consequently, the notion that countries’ 
desire to preserve their tax sovereignty can explain bilateralism is incom-
plete. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper I have constructed an explanation of the design features of 
international tax cooperation. Bilateral bargaining is preferred over multi-
lateral bargaining, because the asymmetry of investment flows can be 
better accommodated in bilateral bargains. Despite this preference for 
bilateral bargains, governments have an interest in developing model 
conventions and a multilateral forum for discussion, serving as a con-
structed focal point. Concerning the ex post phase of cooperation, it was 
shown that there is no need for external enforcement mechanisms. The 
mutual agreement procedure is best understood as a device for dealing 
with the problems of incomplete contracting. Concerns for third country 
benefits, i.e., externalities of bilateral agreements, are not relevant, so that 
there is no free-rider problem and thus no need for multilateral agreement. 
In the case of double tax avoidance, the problems of cooperation lie 
mainly within the sphere of bargaining. Cooperation is made difficult not 
by the fact that enforcement is problematic but by struggling over the 
terms of the agreement. Since the question of “who gets what?” is difficult 
to resolve, most of the governance design elements — for example, con-
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structed focal points and the MAP — concern the facilitation of successful 
bargaining between countries. This finding lends support to the argument 
that considering bargaining and distribution problems is just as important 
as enforcement — the problem much of cooperation theory has focused on 
in the past — and should receive more attention by international relations 
scholars (Simmons and Martin 2002, 204; Fearon 1998, 297-99; Kore-
menos, et al. 2001, 765). However, as shown, this does not mean that the 
enforcement phase can be ignored. To the contrary; it is crucial to under-
stand that the (relative) absence of enforcement problems amplifies the 
intensity of bargaining problems. It also accounts for the fact that multi-
lateral agreement is not necessary. This points to the need to understand 
both the bargaining and enforcement phase, and their interaction in order 
to make sense of institutional design (see, for a similar argument, Drezner 
2000; Barkin 2004). 
These findings exemplify, first, that a straightforward and dichoto-
mous classification of international cooperation into bilateral or multilat-
eral cooperation is unhelpful. Rather, as the comparison with international 
trade suggests, it is quite likely that different policy fields exhibit different 
mixes of bilateralism and multilateralism at different stages of the coop-
eration process. 
Second, these findings suggest that the choice between a bilateral and 
multilateral form of cooperation is contingent on a particular configuration 
and interaction of distribution and enforcement problems. An important 
conclusion to be drawn from my findings for future efforts at theory devel-
opment is to pay close attention to issues of bargaining and distribution 
and their interaction with enforcement problems. It is worthwhile to 
explore other issue areas that may exhibit different configurations of 
distribution and enforcement problems, in order to generate generalizable 
knowledge on the choice between, or the co-existence of, bilateralism and 
multilateralism. 
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